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COMMENT ON MARKET CONDITIONS AND 




This Comment attempts to explain two stylized facts: As the mar-
ket interest rate rises, lenders demand either (a) more collateral, or (b) 
tighter covenants. In their Article, Market Conditions and Contract 
Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, Choi and Triantis (“C&T”) 
use two models in their explanation of these facts: an adverse 
selection model and a moral hazard model. The adverse selection 
model formally analyzes only collateral contracts, but the authors claim 
that both the collateral contract and the covenant contract mitigate ad-
verse selection. The moral hazard model also considers only collateral 
contracts; the claim here is that these best mitigate moral hazard. 
The Article claims to derive three principal results: 
(A) The likelihood that parties write collateral contracts is in-
creasing in the market interest rate (both models). When the problem 
is adverse selection, this result applies to covenants as well. 
(B) Good (i.e., less risky) types are more likely to offer collateral 
than bad types (both models); 
(C) The difference in the contracts of good and bad types widens 
as the market interest rate increases (both models). 
This Comment argues that under symmetric information, results 
(A) and (C) continue to hold but result (B) reverses: Bad types offer 
more collateral than good types. Symmetric information is the more 
plausible assumption in the Article’s adverse selection setup. I make 
three other points: (i) C&T’s moral hazard model assumes that bor-
rowers are ex ante identical: Every borrower is equally likely to pur-
sue a later project that disadvantages the initial lender. This setup 
cannot explain why some parties—lenders and borrowers—use 
covenants while other, apparently similar parties, use security; (ii) 
Letting borrowers differ ex ante may explain when parties prefer one 
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or the other risk reduction device. In this framework, the better ar-
gument continues to be that bad types offer more collateral than good 
types; (iii) Turning to empirics, some data rejects C&T’s result (B): 
Bad types appear in fact to offer more collateral than good types. 
Because this data is not current, it cannot settle the issue. On the 
other hand, and to summarize, the data and the analysis raise the 
question whether C&T are using the right models for the problem. 
I 
 SUBSTITUTING SYMMETRIC INFORMATION FOR HIDDEN INFORMATION 
An adverse selection model supposes that a borrower’s riskiness 
is private information. Symmetric information, however, is a more 
plausible assumption in C&T’s setup, in which the borrower brings 
one project to market and asks a single creditor to finance much or all 
of it. The debt contract will contain covenants, and these require the 
disclosure of what would otherwise be private information. 
Covenants require the borrower (i) to stay in the same line of busi-
ness; (ii) to maintain its properties in good order; (iii) to maintain 
specified ratios of current assets to current liabilities; (iv) to maintain 
specified ratios of total liabilities to tangible net worth; (v) to incur 
only “permitted” debt; (vi) to open its books to the creditor at fre-
quent intervals and to supply audited financials; and (vii) to report 
compliance with the nonfinancial restrictions. These covenants enable 
the lender to be well informed about the borrower’s current state.1 
Now contrast a simple symmetric information model of the one 
project context to C&T’s adverse selection model. In the simple 
model, I is project cost, which the lender supplies; r is the market in-
terest rate; p is the probability that the borrower’s current project 
succeeds; R is the face value of the loan (the sum the borrower agrees 
to repay); A is the assets the lender can reach on default. The bor-
rower agrees to repay R one period later and the credit market is 
competitive. 
The borrower pays an effective interest rate of r* = R/I – 1. To 
see where R comes from, the lender earns zero profits in a competi-
tive equilibrium; hence, it expects only to recover the investment cost I. 
Its expected payoff is: 
I	ൌ	δሾpR	൅	ሺ1	–	pሻAሿ, where	δ	ൌ	1/ሺ1൅rሻ.	
Solving for R, 
 
 1 Private loans of this type are commonly described as “information rich.” 
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R ൌ ܫሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܣ݌	  
The face value of the loan, R, and therefore the effective interest 
rate r*, is increasing in the market interest rate r and is decreasing in 
A and p. The project choice determines I, and r is exogenous. The 
borrower has two choice variables. He can increase the success prob-
ability p by working harder; more relevant here, he can increase the 
asset base A by offering collateral. Regarding this second response, 
the lender can reach A after obtaining a judgment for nonpayment. 
Collateral, however, reduces the lender’s cost of seizing and selling 
assets and accelerates the lender’s return. Hence, collateral increases 
the net value of the assets that back the loan. 
Turning to C&T’s result that collateral is more likely as the mar-
ket interest rate increases, when the discount factor falls the required 
repayment sum R is less valuable to the lender. Also, the assets that 
back the loan become less valuable because, without security, the 
lender cannot realize on those assets for some time. The lender 
responds to the reduction in the value of both return possibilities—
repayment or foreclosure—by increasing R, the face value of the loan; 
this in turn raises r*. Both strong and weak borrower types have an 
incentive to respond by effectively increasing the asset base A; that is, 
by offering security. 
Contrary to C&T’s result (B), however, an increase in the market 
interest rate makes weak borrowers more likely to offer security than 
strong borrowers. The success probability p can be a proxy for the 
strength of the borrower: The projects of strong borrowers are more 
likely to succeed than the projects of weak borrowers. Differentiating 
R by r yields I/p > 0. The face value of the loan, R, increases as the 
borrower’s project is less likely to succeed. Intuitively, the lower p is, 
the more weight the lender puts on the default state, in which it is re-
stricted to the borrower’s bad state assets. Because these are less valu-
able than the good state assets, the lender responds by raising R, its 
good state pay off, more for weak borrowers than for strong borrowers. 
The weak borrowers thus have a relatively stronger incentive than 
strong borrowers to offer collateral as the market interest rate in-
creases. 
To summarize, a simple symmetric information model of the one 
borrower, one loan context shows that (i) an increase in the market in-
terest rate increases the incentive of all borrowers to offer security, 
confirming C&T’s result (A); and (ii) the incentive to offer 
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collateral bears more harshly on the weak borrowers, making them 
more likely to offer security, and thereby disconfirming C&T’s result 
(B). Intuitively, when money becomes more costly, creditors are less 
willing to lend to the more problematic borrowers. The sharp differ-
ence in predictions that hidden information and symmetric information 
models yield should permit the empiricist to reject one or the other 
model. 
II  
A MORE PLAUSIBLE MORAL HAZARD MODEL 
In the model here, the lender can evaluate the borrower’s current 
project, for the reasons given in the symmetric information model, 
but faces uncertainty because it does not know what the borrower’s 
next project will be. The asset beta characterizes a project’s riskiness. 
 
ߚ௣௥௢௝௘௖௧ ൌ 	ߚ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘ ൬1 ൅	݀ܣ൰ 
The present value of the borrower’s current debt is d and the bor-
rower’s current assets are A. 
Now let the borrower take a second project. If the first project 
constitutes g% of the borrower’s total value, the borrower’s total asset 
beta becomes: 
 
ߚ௙௜௥௠ ൌ ݃ߚଵ ൅	ሺ1 െ ݃ሻߚଶ 
As is apparent, if the borrower’s second project has a positive net 
present value, but is debt financed, the project can increase the bor-
rower’s riskiness if β2> β1. Relevant here, a second project is likely to 
increase risk if the ratio of debt to assets on the second project is 
higher than the debt/asset ratio on the initial project. As a conse-
quence, early lenders face risk even when borrowers take only effi-
cient projects. The risk is that a borrower’s later project choice will 
dilute the value of the initial loan. 
The model makes five assumptions: 
A1: A weak borrower’s portfolio of future projects is distributed 
on G(ݒw) with support [0, ݒw]. A strong borrower’s portfolio of future 
projects is distributed on G(vs) with support [0, ݒw]: ݒw < ݒs. The lender 
knows G(ݒw) and G(ݒs) but which future project a borrower draws is pri-
vate information. Thus, (i) both borrower types can draw a strong or 
a weak later project but the strong borrower is more likely to draw a 
strong project; and (ii) the lender can distinguish weak from strong 
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borrowers when it makes the initial loan. 
A2: Covenants permit the lender to prevent either borrower type 
from taking a second project. Covenants thus enable the lender to 
control the riskiness of the borrower. 
A3: Security also permits the lender to prevent the borrower from 
taking a second project. Hence, again contract terms enable the initial 
lender to control risk. 
A4: Contracting costs are positive: A security contract costs ks to 
write; a covenant contract costs kc. The security contract is more expen-
sive: kc < ks. 
A5: A covenant contract is enforceable only against the borrower; 
a security contract is enforceable against the borrower and third par-
ties. The borrower, however, can credibly commit to comply with its 
covenants. 
Turning to the analysis, assumptions A2 and A3 imply that lend-
ers require and borrowers offer either covenants or security to reduce 
the risk of loan dilution. Assumptions A4 and A5 imply that covenants 
are preferred. If covenant contracts are less costly to write and are as 
effective as security contracts, only covenant contracts exist. Security 
contracts and covenant contracts coexist, however. Which assumption 
should be relaxed? 
Assumption A1 implies that the most plausible answer is A4. A 
borrower who trips covenants may incur (i) a reputational loss; (ii) the 
imposition of extra fees; (iii) debt acceleration; and (iv) bankruptcy. 
These costs bear more harshly on strong firms, which expect to con-
tinue, than on weak firms, which expect difficulty. For example, a 
borrower that expects to reenter the loan market periodically weighs a 
reputational loss heavily. A borrower in trouble may discount this loss 
if only a second debt financed risky project can rescue it. Because cov-
enants are enforceable only against the debtor, this reasoning implies 
that weak borrowers who trip covenants are harder to punish than 
strong borrowers. A security contract binds third party lenders; hence, 
collateral materially reduces the risk of loan dilution. 
Turning to the contracting stage, an equilibrium in which both 
borrower types offer covenants violates subgame perfection. 
Recalling that lenders can distinguish borrower types, the weak bor-
rower’s promise to abide by covenants is less credible than the strong 
borrower’s promise. 
The more reasonable equilibrium thus has borrowers separating. 
Lenders require strong borrowers to offer covenants and weak bor-
rowers to offer collateral. 
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CONCLUSION 
C&T’s first model assumes that borrowers make one loan and 
there is hidden information: The lender does not know the borrower’s 
type. Their second model assumes that all borrower types are ex ante 
identical; a borrower pursues (at least) two debt financed projects 
over its life; and there is hidden action—the creditor, at the time of 
the initial loan, does not know which later project a borrower will 
choose. This Comment argues that it is more plausible to assume 
symmetric information in the one loan context, and it is more plausi-
ble to suppose that borrowers differ ex ante. On the substituted as-
sumptions, C&T’s result (B) reverses: It is the strong borrowers who 
offer covenants to lenders and the weak borrowers who offer security. 
This new result raises a question of model selection. What is the most 
productive way to model the simple loan contexts that C&T study? 
The data appear to reject C&T’s argument, showing that risky 
firms are more likely to offer security than safe firms. The data is a 
little old, but it also is consistent with casual empiricism. The two 
models sketched in this Comment are pretty simple, however. The 
Comment’s conclusion thus is that (i) C&T should apply their models 
to data and look for current support; (ii) in the absence of supporting 
data, the appropriate model for these problems is yet to be written. 
 
